Wyoming Law Review
Volume 12

Number 1

Article 8

January 2012

Property Law - He Buys the House and She Keeps Half: The
Wyoming Supreme Court's Approach to Cohabitation and
Cotenancy; Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816 (Wyo. 2010)
Thomas Szott

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr

Recommended Citation
Szott, Thomas (2012) "Property Law - He Buys the House and She Keeps Half: The Wyoming Supreme
Court's Approach to Cohabitation and Cotenancy; Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816 (Wyo. 2010),"
Wyoming Law Review: Vol. 12 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss1/8

This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Szott: Property Law - He Buys the House and She Keeps Half: The Wyoming

Case Note
PROPERTY LAW—He Buys the House and She Keeps Half:
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s Approach to Cohabitation and
Cotenancy; Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816 (Wyo. 2010)
Thomas Szott*
Introduction
In Jude the Obscure, Thomas Hardy’s quintessential bad woman, Arabella Donn,
discusses the advantages of marriage over cohabitation. She observes pragmatically:
Life with a man is more businesslike after it, and money matters
work better. And then, you see, if you have rows, and he turns
you out of doors, you can get the law to protect you, which you
can’t otherwise, unless he half runs you through with a knife,
or cracks your noddle with a poker. And if he bolts away from
you—I say it friendly, as woman to woman, for there’s never any
knowing what a man med do—you’ll have the sticks o’ furniture,
and won’t be looked upon as a thief.1
Cohabitants may have fared poorly in Hardy’s novel, but if Arabella were
cohabiting in Wyoming today, she would find the law much friendlier.
Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine of common-law marriage, but
the Wyoming Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced valid agreements between
cohabitants, including agreements to divide real and personal property.2 Moreover,
in the absence of express agreements, the court makes equitable remedies available
to protect the lawful expectations of cohabiting parties.3

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2013. My thanks to Jared Miller, Kyle
Ridgeway, and the Wyoming Law Review Editorial Board for their assistance throughout this process.
1

Thomas Hardy, Jude the Obscure 212 (Norman Page ed., Norton 1999) (2d ed. 1912).

Berg v. Hayward (In re Reeves’ Estate), 133 P.2d 503, 504 (Wyo. 1943) (“[C]ommon
law marriages entered into in this state are not valid.”) (citing Roberts v. Roberts (In re Roberts’
Estate), 133 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1943)); see, e.g., Allen v. Anderson, 253 P.3d 182, 183–84 (Wyo. 2011)
(affirming the distribution of a formerly cohabiting couple’s real and personal property pursuant to
a settlement agreement between the parties); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595–96 (Wyo.
1981) (affirming the enforcement of an oral agreement between cohabitants in settlement of the
woman’s equitable claims).
2

See Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 438 (Wyo. 1998) (“We note that the theor[y] of . . .
quantum meruit [has] been available to cohabiting parties in Wyoming since 1980 . . . .”); infra
notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
3
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In Hofstad v. Christie, the court considered a dispute between former
cohabitants Jerald Hofstad and Cathryn Christie who owned a house as tenants in
common.4 Hofstad had contributed significantly more money toward acquiring
the house,5 but the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the Law of Property
rule, which presumes cotenants share their property equally—despite unequal
contributions—unless “there is neither a family relationship among the co-tenants
nor any evidence of donative intent” by the excess contributor.6 Finding evidence
of a family relationship between the parties and donative intent by Hofstad, the
court awarded Christie an equal share of the house.7
Other courts applying the Law of Property rule have interpreted the rule as
establishing an irrebuttable presumption of equal shares between cotenants if they
share a family relationship or if the excess contributor evinced donative intent.8
Such an interpretation essentially grants legal status to cohabiting cotenants who
share a family relationship because such a relationship requires a court to divide
their property equally, irrespective of unequal contributions or the parties’ intent.9
However, the Wyoming Supreme Court did not interpret the Law of Property rule
as granting legal status to cohabitants in a family relationship.10
Instead, this note demonstrates that the Hofstad court rejected a rigid
interpretation of the Law of Property rule in favor of a flexible analytical framework
under which the nature of the relationship between cotenants is not dispositive
but merely relevant to establishing their intent.11 This note further argues that
future Wyoming courts, rather than retaining the original language of the Law
of Property rule, should adopt an alternative formulation that comports with the
reasoning in Hofstad and comports with established Wyoming law.12 Lastly, this
note examines the state of Wyoming cotenancy law after Hofstad and contends
the Hofstad court, far from reviving the doctrine of common-law marriage or
otherwise recognizing legal status for cohabitants, affirmed the longstanding
Wyoming principles that cohabitants are bound by their promises and that
no relationship between cotenants establishes an irrebuttable presumption of
equal ownership.13

4

240 P.3d 816, 817–19 (Wyo. 2010).

5

Id. at 819.

6

Id. at 818–19; see infra note 42 and accompanying text (describing the Law of Property rule).

7

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 822.

8

See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 49–53, 68–75 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 130–45, 196–202 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 130–45, 158–61 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 146–83 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 184–206 and accompanying text.
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Background
Increases in Cohabitation
Cohabitation—a man and woman living together in a sexual relationship
without being married—is increasingly common in the United States.14 In 1988,
only 5.2% of women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four were actively
cohabiting and only 33.5% had cohabited in the past.15 By 2002, these percentages
had risen to 9.1% and 50.0%, respectively.16 In fact, the 2010 Census revealed
that almost 6.0% of American households included a cohabiting couple.17 The
prevalence of cohabitation in Wyoming was even greater, at nearly 6.2% of
all households.18
In 1976, the California Supreme Court noted the sharp increase in
cohabiting relationships and the difficulty faced by courts in determining the
property rights of former cohabitants.19 The continuing increase in the number
of cohabiting relationships suggests that court’s observations are even truer today,
both nationwide and in Wyoming.

Paula Y. Goodwin et al., Marriage and Cohabitation in the United States: A Statistical Portrait
Based on Cycle 6 (2002) of the National Survey of Family Growth, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics,
Vital and Health Statistics Ser. 23 No. 28, 1, 4 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_23/sr23_028.pdf. For purposes of this note, “cohabitants” and “cohabitation,” unless otherwise
stated, refer exclusively to opposite-sex couples.
14

Kathryn A. London, Cohabitation, Marriage, Marital Dissolution, and Remarriage: United
States, 1988, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Advance Data No. 194, at 1–2 (1991), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad194.pdf.
15

16

Goodwin, supra note 14, at 17, 27.

American Fact Finder: Unmarried-Partner Households by Sex of Partner in the United States
and Wyoming, U.S. Census Bureau (2010), http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/
ACS/10_1YR/B11009/0100000US|0400000US56 (displaying data from American Community
Survey 1-Year Estimates) (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). This is up from approximately 5.2% of
households in 2000. Tavia Simmons and Martin O’Connell, Married-Couple and Unmarried-Partner
Households: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/
censr-5.pdf.
17

American Fact Finder: Unmarried-Partner Households by Sex of Partner in the United States
and Wyoming, supra note 17.
18

19
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110–11 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). In Marvin, the court held
that lawful agreements between cohabitants are enforceable and that in the absence of an express
agreement, courts may look to equitable remedies to protect the lawful expectations of the parties.
Id. at 122–23.
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Prior Wyoming Cohabitation Cases
The Wyoming Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of common-law
marriage in 1943.20 Since then, the court has applied traditional principles of
contract law in resolving disputes between cohabitants. In Kinnison v. Kinnison,
the court enforced an oral agreement between former cohabitants in settlement of
the woman’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims.21 In Shaw v. Smith,
the court remanded for a jury to consider whether former cohabitants had entered
into a valid oral agreement and resolve the plaintiff ’s unjust enrichment claim.22
In Adkins v. Lawson, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover through
an unjust enrichment claim the value of household services performed during a
period of cohabitation because she could not demonstrate that she had expected
to be paid for those services.23 And in Bereman v. Bereman, the court held an
alleged oral agreement between former cohabitants void under the Statute of
Frauds, explaining that cohabitants “can enter into binding contracts,” but that
“purported ‘agreements’ between such couples are [not] exempt from compliance
with Wyoming’s law of contracts.”24
In Schulz v. Miller, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered the case of a
cohabiting couple who purchased a “home site lot” via a purchase agreement
identifying the purchasers as “Stephen P. Schulz & Polly L. Miller” and a deed
listing the grantees as “Stephen P. Schulz, a single man, and Polly L. Miller, a
single woman, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.”25 Schulz paid the entire
purchase price.26 The parties subsequently separated, and the trial court awarded
Miller a fifty-percent interest in the lot.27 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed,
holding the “two litigants agreed how title was to be vested: ‘Stephen P. Schulz

Berg v. Hayward (In re Reeves’ Estate), 133 P.2d 503, 504 (Wyo. 1943) (declaring that
“common law marriages entered into in this state are not valid”) (citing Roberts v. Roberts (In re
Roberts’ Estate), 133 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1943)).
20

21
627 P.2d 594, 595–96 (Wyo. 1981). In Kinnison, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
agreements between cohabitants are enforceable unless sexual services are the only consideration. Id.
at 595 (citing Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113).
22
964 P.2d 428, 436–37 (Wyo. 1998). In Shaw, the contract issue was whether “a jury could
reasonably determine that [the parties] bargained for his promise to provide financial protection
and make her a partner in life in exchange for [her] efforts on behalf of [his] family and business
interests.” Id. at 436.
23

892 P.2d 128, 131–32 (Wyo. 1995).

645 P.2d 1155, 1158–59 (Wyo. 1982) (citing Kinnison, 627 P.2d at 595). The agreement
in Bereman came within the Statute of Frauds because, “according to [the woman’s] own testimony
the agreement was a three-year plan.” Id. at 1159.
24

25

837 P.2d 71, 72–73 (Wyo. 1992).

26

Id. at 73.

27

Id. at 72.
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and Polly L. Miller.’ By this document, each became an equal co-owner.”28 The
Schulz court rested its holding on contract law principles, emphasizing Schulz was
“not a real estate gift conveyance case where the donor subsequently questions the
extent of his gift by deed.”29

Prior Wyoming Cotenancy Cases
In cases considering the ownership shares of cotenants, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has established several principles of cotenancy law.30 When the instrument
of conveyance expressly assigns each party a certain share in the property, the
instrument controls and parol evidence may not be admitted to contradict it.31 If
the instrument of conveyance does not otherwise specify, the parties are presumed
to own equal shares, but this presumption may be rebutted by parol evidence of
unequal contributions toward the property.32
In cases involving married cotenants who subsequently disputed their
respective shares in jointly owned property, the Wyoming Supreme Court has
repeatedly held “[t]hat when title to real estate was taken in the names of both
spouses but only one spouse paid for it, there [is] a rebuttable presumption that a
fifty percent interest was intended as a gift to the nonpaying spouse.”33 In marital

28

Id. at 74. Justice Cardine dissented:
The purchase offer and acceptance agreement indicates only that appellant and
appellee are the purchasers of this real estate. From the writing itself, it is impossible
to ascertain who should pay, whether there was a gift, or how title should be held.
Appellant was lawfully entitled to introduce parole evidence, and the district court
should have allowed it to arrive at the intent of the parties to this transaction.

Id. at 78 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
29

Id. at 76 (majority opinion).

See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. “‘[T]enancy’ is the possession of real or
personal property by right or title, especially under a conveying instrument such as a deed or will.
A ‘cotenancy’ is a tenancy under more than one distinct title, but with unity of possession.” 20 Am.
Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 1 (2005) (citations omitted).
30

31
See Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., 86 P.3d 843, 850 (Wyo. 2004) (“No parol evidence can be
considered to determine what property rights were granted because the deed provides the answer.”).
In Bixler, the Wyoming Supreme Court construed its earlier decision in Schulz v. Miller as holding
that, because “the terms of the deed were unambiguous . . . parol evidence could not be considered
to determine the parties’ rights to the property.” Id. (citing Schulz, 837 P.2d at 75).

Id. at 851. In Binning v. Miller, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that, “in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, joint purchasers of an estate [hold] shares therein in proportion to
their contribution to the purchase price.” 102 P.2d 64, 77 (Wyo. 1940) (citation omitted). In Bixler,
the Wyoming Supreme Court construed Binning as consistent with the principle that evidence of
unequal contributions may rebut the threshold presumption of equal shares between cotenants.
Bixler, 86 P.3d at 850–51.
32

DeJohn v. DeJohn, 121 P.3d 802, 809 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d
1, 4 (Wyo. 2000)); see Tyler v. Tyler, 624 P.2d 784, 785–86 (Wyo. 1981). In Wyoming, marital
property disputes are also governed by statute:
33
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cotenancy cases, the court has regularly disposed of property based on the intent
of the parties.34

Bixler v. Oro Management and the Law of Property Rule
In the 2004 case Bixler v. Oro Management, the Wyoming Supreme Court
adopted a new cotenancy rule that framed its discussion in Hofstad v. Christie
six years later.35 In Bixler, the parties acquired property via warranty deed as
tenants in common, intending to develop the property for mining.36 The parties
contributed equal amounts toward the purchase price.37 Many details of the
parties’ agreement were never memorialized in writing, and after various disputes
between the parties, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking partition of the property.38
The district court held that while the plaintiff was entitled to an equal share of
the surface estate, he owned no interest in the mineral estate based on a prior
agreement between the parties.39
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the prior agreement
had merged into the deed; thus, the deed itself controlled the parties’ respective
interests.40 The court found the deed unambiguous and awarded the plaintiff a
share of the mineral estate.41

In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of
the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the
parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through
whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the
benefit of either party and children.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (2011).
34
See DeJohn, 121 P.3d at 805–07, 809 (affirming the award of jointly owned property to the
husband in a divorce proceeding because this property had been acquired using assets he acquired
prior to the marriage and specifically told his wife he did not intend to share with her); Barton,
996 P.2d at 4–5 (finding that a husband who had purchased property with his assets and titled
it in his wife’s name intended to give it to her and awarding the property to the wife in a divorce
proceeding); Tyler, 624 P.2d at 786–87 (affirming the award of an equal interest in a jointly owned
house to the wife in a divorce proceeding, even though the husband paid the entire purchase price,
based on the finding that he intended to share the house equally with her).
35

Bixler, 86 P.3d at 850; see infra notes 42–44, 103 and accompanying text.

86 P.3d at 845–46. “A tenancy in common is a form of ownership in which each cotenant
owns a separate fractional share of undivided property. The property may be owned in equal or unequal
undivided shares, with each person having an equal right to possess the whole property, but no right of
survivorship.” 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 31 (2005) (citations omitted).
36

37

Bixler, 86 P.3d at 851. The plaintiff “paid $365,000 of the $700,000 purchase price.” Id.

38

Id. at 846.

39

Id. at 847.

40

Id. at 849–50.

41

Id.
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In dictum, however, the Bixler court adopted a rule from the treatise, The
Law of Property (the Law of Property rule):
If the instrument does not specify the shares of each co-tenant,
it will be presumed that they take equal undivided interests.
However, this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the
co-tenants contributed unequal amounts toward the purchase
price of the property and there is neither a family relationship
among the co-tenants nor any evidence of donative intent on the
part of those who contributed more than their pro rata amounts
toward the purchase price.42
The first half of the Law of Property rule merely restates established Wyoming
law: cotenants are presumed to own equal shares in their property when the
instrument of conveyance does not otherwise specify, but this presumption may
be rebutted by evidence of unequal contributions toward acquiring the property.43
The additional requirement that there be “neither a family relationship . . . nor
any evidence of donative intent,” however, is unique to The Law of Property and
cases citing it.44

Id. at 850 (citing William B. Stoebuck et al., The Law of Property § 5.2 (2d ed. 1993)).
The Bixler court made inconsequential alterations to the language of the Law of Property rule; the
exact language reads:
42

If the instrument does not specify the shares of each cotenant, it will be presumed
that they take equal undivided interests, but this presumption may be rebutted by
proof, e.g., that the tenants contributed unequal amounts toward the purchase price
of the property and there is neither a family relationship among the cotenants nor any
evidence of donative intent on the part of those who contributed more than their pro
rata amounts toward the purchase price.
Stoebuck, supra (footnotes omitted). The Bixler court separately quoted the Law of Property
rule a second time from a decision by the Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
but erroneously attributed the quotation to the Missouri Supreme Court. 86 P.3d at 850 (citing
Christen v. Christen, 38 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
43

See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.

Compare Stoebuck, supra note 42, with Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 818–19 (Wyo.
2010) (citing Bixler, 86 P.3d at 850), and Hoit v. Rankin, 320 S.W.3d 761, 766–67 (Mo. W. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Montgomery v. Roberts, 714 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo. E. Dist. Ct. App.
1986)), and Johannsen v. McClain, 235 S.W.3d 86, 87–88 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citations
omitted), and Clark v. Dady, 131 S.W.3d 382, 389 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citations
omitted), and Food Servs. Corp. v. Rheam, 145 S.W.3d 484, 493 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(citing Christen, 38 S.W.3d at 492), and Christen, 38 S.W.3d at 492 (quoting Montgomery, 714
S.W.2d at 236), and Lemay v. Hardin, 48 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
Christen, 38 S.W.3d at 492), and Higgins v. Olson, 991 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Mo. E. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (quoting Montgomery, 714 S.W.2d at 236), and Albright v. Kelley, 926 S.W.2d 207, 210 n.3
(Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Montgomery, 714 S.W.2d at 236), and Montgomery, 714
S.W.2d at 236 (quoting Stoebuck, supra note 42, § 5.2 (1984)).
44
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The Bixler court had no occasion to apply this additional requirement, of
course, because the deed in question was unambiguous and, moreover, the parties
had contributed equally toward purchasing the disputed property.45 Thus, having
adopted language unique to the Law of Property rule, the Bixler court offered no
guidance as to how this language might apply in future cases.

The Law of Property Rule in Missouri
While the Wyoming Supreme Court did not apply the Law of Property rule
in Bixler, several Missouri courts have applied the rule to settle property disputes
between cohabitants and other cotenants.46 Other than Wyoming, Missouri
appears to be the only jurisdiction to have cited the unique “family relationship . . .
donative intent” language of the Law of Property rule verbatim.47 The Missouri
Courts of Appeals are currently divided as to the interpretation of this language.48
Most Missouri courts state the original language of the rule verbatim. Under
this interpretation, the presumption that cotenants share equal ownership of
their property “may be rebutted by proof that the cotenants contributed unequal
amounts toward the purchase price.”49 But if the court finds a family relationship
between the parties or donative intent by the excess contributor, the presumption
of equal shares becomes irrebuttable.50

45

Bixler, 86 P.3d at 848–51.

E.g., Hoth v. Hoth, 339 S.W.3d 540, 541–42 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Christen, 38
S.W.3d at 492; Montgomery, 714 S.W.2d at 236.
46

See supra note 44. Courts in other jurisdictions, without citing The Law of Property,
have adopted similar language. E.g., Dern v. Dern (In re Estate of the Dern Family Trust), 928
P.2d 123, 132 (Mont. 1996) (“Where cotenants are related or cohabit and intend to confer equal
shares as a gift to the other cotenant despite unequal contribution the property must be divided in
equal shares.”); Sack v. Tomlin, 871 P.2d 298, 304 (Nev. 1994) (“[U]nequal contributions toward
acquisition of property by cotenants who are not related and show no donative intent can rebut the
presumption of equal shares.” (citations omitted)); infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing
the source cases for the Law of Property rule).
47

48

See infra notes 49–67 and accompanying text.

49

See Montgomery, 714 S.W.2d at 236 (quoting Stoebuck, supra note 42, § 5.2 (1984)).

Id. (holding that the presumption of equal ownership may only be rebutted by evidence
of unequal contribution if “there is neither a family relationship among the co-tenants nor any
evidence of donative intent”); see Christen, 38 S.W.3d at 492 (“[U]nequal contribution is irrelevant
in determining the joint tenants’ respective shares when there is a family relationship between the
tenants or when there is evidence of donative intent.” (citations omitted)). Recently, considering a
dispute between former cohabitants Michael and Nora, the Southern District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals reformulated the “verbatim” interpretation as a three-part test:
50

As unmarried co-grantees by deed, Nora and Michael held the property as tenants in
common. Nora could seek partition, requiring the trial court to determine each party’s
interest in the property. Equal co-ownership was presumed since the deed did not

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss1/8
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In a 2010 case, a federal bankruptcy court provided perhaps the clearest
application of the “verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property rule.51 In that
case, a mother and her two daughters held property as joint tenants, though the
mother paid the full purchase price and all costs associated with maintaining
the property.52 The bankruptcy court applied the “verbatim” interpretation
and declared: “[B]ecause [the parties] have a family relationship, I need not
reach the question of donative intent as to this issue. Because of the family
relationship, the unequal contribution is irrelevant and the presumption of equal
ownership stands.”53
In Hoit v. Rankin, the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
rejected the “verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property rule.54 The court first
argued that, under the language of the rule, the presumption of equal ownership
between cotenants only becomes irrebuttable if a court finds both a family
relationship and donative intent (the “modified verbatim” interpretation).55 But
having first argued that the original language of the Law of Property rule requires
the “modified verbatim” interpretation, the court held that the original language
of the Law of Property rule should no longer be quoted at all.56
Exploring the development of the rule at length, the Hoit court observed
that, while the authors of the Law of Property primarily relied on the 1932 Illinois
Supreme Court decision in People v. Varel, the Law of Property formulation differs
significantly from the language used in Varel.57 Indeed, the Varel court declared:
state otherwise. Michael could rebut this presumption with substantial evidence that
he (1) disproportionally contributed to the purchase, (2) had no family relationship
with Nora, and (3) lacked donative intent toward her.
Hoth, 339 S.W.3d at 541 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted) (citing Johannsen v.
McClain, 235 S.W.3d 86, 87–88 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
Nelson v. Killman (In re Killman), Bankr. No. 08-61703, Adversary No. 09-6075, 2010
WL 743685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2010); see Hoit v. Rankin, 320 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Mo. W.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (describing Nelson as realizing “the full impact” of the verbatim interpretation).
51

52

Nelson, 2010 WL 743685 at *1–2.

Id. at *3 nn.11–14 (citing Johannsen, 235 S.W.3d at 87; Christen, 38 S.W.3d at 492;
Montgomery, 714 S.W.2d at 236).
53

54
320 S.W.3d at 772 (“We conclude that the principle first cited in Montgomery relating to
‘neither family relationship nor donative intent’ should no longer be cited verbatim.”).
55
Id. at 769–70. In making this argument, the court seems to have misread the Law of
Property rule. The court described the rule as stating, “the presumption of equal ownership can be
rebutted in the absence of neither a family relationship nor donative intent.” Id. The Law of Property
rule, however, does not contain the phrase “in the absence of.” See Stoebuck, supra note 42. Rather,
the Law of Property rule states that the presumption of equal ownership may be rebutted if there is
evidence of unequal contribution “and there is neither a family relationship among the co-tenants
nor any evidence of donative intent.” Id.
56
Hoit, 320 S.W.3d at 772. In Hoit, the court discussed the 1984 edition of The Law of
Property. Id. at 776.
57

Id. at 767 (citing People v. Varel, 184 N.E. 209 (Ill. 1932)).
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Where title to property is taken in the name of two persons
as cotenants, and their contributions to the purchase price of the
property are unequal and their relationship is not such that a gift
from one to the other is presumed to be intended, they will in
equity be held to own the property in the proportions of their
contributions to the purchase price.58
The Hoit court observed two significant differences between the Varel
formulation of the rule and the Law of Property formulation.59 First, the Varel
court did not include the word “family” before “relationship;” the authors of The
Law of Property apparently inserted “family” unilaterally.60 Second, and more
importantly, the language of the rule in Varel merely indicates that a relationship
between the parties indicating donative intent is relevant to a court considering
whether to permit evidence of unequal contribution to rebut the presumption
of equal ownership between cotenants.61 The Law of Property formulation,
conversely, treats “family relationship” and “donative intent” as independent
requirements that, if either is established, render the presumption of equal
ownership irrebuttable as a matter of law.62
The Hoit court described the Varel rule as “a simple principle of evidence . . .
[that] is eminently reasonable” and the Law of Property rule as “an inflexible litmus
test.”63 In its holding, the court chose the simple principle over the litmus test:
The presumption that co-tenants hold equal ownership shares
in the face of a deed that is otherwise silent may be rebutted.
Evidence relevant to rebut the presumption may include evidence
that the co-tenants contributed unequally toward the purchase of
the property. However, unequal contributions may be explained
by evidence that the co-tenant contributing a greater amount
toward purchase intended the disparity as an enforceable gift,
a determination which may be influenced by evidence of the
nature of the relationship among the co-tenants.64

Varel, 184 N.E. at 211 (citation omitted). In addition to Varel, the authors of The Law of
Property cite three other cases as sources for the rule: Succession of LeBlanc, 577 So.2d 105 (La. Ct.
App. 1991), Taylor v. Taylor, 17 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 1945), and Williams v. Monzingo, 16 N.W.2d
619 (Iowa 1944). Stoebuck, supra note 42, at n.31.
58

59

Hoit, 320 S.W.3d at 767.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 768.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 768, 770.

64

Id. at 772.
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Thus, unlike the “verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property rule, the Hoit
“relevant evidence” formulation considers evidence of unequal contributions to
be relevant even if the parties share a family relationship or one party evinced
donative intent.65
Following the decision in Hoit, the Western District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals now applies the “relevant evidence” formulation of the Law of Property
rule.66 Just a few months after Hoit, however, the Southern District of the Missouri
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its adherence to the “verbatim” interpretation.67 The
issue has not reached the Missouri Supreme Court and remains unsettled.

Division of Property Based on Legal Status
“‘[L]egal status’ . . . refer[s] to a relationship between persons which, by
virtue of its existence, entails legal consequences.”68 Traditionally, cohabiting
couples could sometimes achieve legal status through the doctrine of commonlaw marriage.69 Only a handful of states still recognize the doctrine today,70 but
Professor Goldberg has suggested that states may revive common-law marriage
by extending shared property rights to couples whose relationships resemble
traditional marriages and recognizing these relationships as “committed intimate
relationships” and domestic partnerships.71

65

Id.

See Felderman v. Zweifel, 346 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“We frame
our . . . analysis as instructed in our recent decision of Hoit v. Rankin.” (citing Hoit, 320 S.W.3d
at 761)).
66

67
See Hoth v. Hoth, 339 S.W.3d 540, 541 n.3 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); supra note 50
(discussing Hoth).
68
Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7
J.L. & Fam. Stud. 135, 158 (2005). Marital and parent-child relationships are the quintessential
family status relationships, entailing legal consequences in situations as diverse as “child custody,
support, property, inheritance, taxation, social benefit programs, tort law, and criminal law.” Id.
at 158–59.

Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of CommonLaw Marriage, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 483, 490–91 (2007) (discussing the origins of
common-law marriage in the United States).
69

Mahoney, supra note 68, at 185; see R.H.S., Validity of Common-law Marriage in American
Jurisdictions, 133 A.L.R. 758 (1941).
70

Goldberg, supra note 69, at 537. Several states have granted legal status to certain
cohabiting couples by passing domestic partnership laws. Lloyd T. Kelso, Recognition of Unmarried
Cohabitation as a Legal Status Worthy of Protection, 1 N.C. Fam. L. Practice § 1:5 (2011) (citing
statutes from California, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and Vermont). State domestic partnership
statutes vary in their scope. Compare Cal. Fam. Code § 297 (West 2011) (requiring one member
of an opposite-sex domestic partnership to be over the age of 62), and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C-4
(2011) (restricting “reciprocal beneficiary relationship[s]” to opposite-sex couples who cannot legally
marry), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8A-4 (West 2011) (requiring both members of an opposite-sex
domestic partnership to be over the age of 62), with Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 2710 (2011) (allowing
71
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In Washington, for example, courts apply five factors to determine whether a
cohabiting relationship is “meretricious” for the purpose of property distribution.72
Upon finding a “meretricious” relationship, a Washington court must evaluate
each party’s interest in property acquired during the relationship and then make
a just and equitable division of the property.73 Thus, couples in a “meretricious”
relationship enjoy legal status in Washington.74
Similarly, cotenants who share a family relationship enjoy legal status under
the “verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property rule because, irrespective
of their intent, their family relationship entitles them to equal shares of their
property.75 Missouri courts, however, have never found a family relationship
between unmarried cohabitants under the Law of Property rule.76

Beal v. Beal and Division of Property Based on the Intent of the Parties
Rather than utilize a specialized principle of cotenancy like the Law of Property
rule, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Beal v. Beal held that the rules of cotenancy
are not dispositive in cohabitation cases.77 In Beal, the court considered a dispute
between parties who, following their divorce, purchased a house for $22,500 in
which they continued living together for two years.78 Though divorced, the sales

opposite-sex domestic partnerships between unmarried adults “domiciled together under long-term
arrangements” who “evidence a commitment to remain responsible indefinitely for each other’s
welfare”). In 2000, the American Law Institute recommended recognition of a domestic partnership
status for opposite- and same-sex cohabiting couples under which cohabitants would have the
same property rights as married couples upon the dissolution of their relationships. American
Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis & Recommendations
§§ 6.01–.05 (2002).
72
In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (citing Connell
v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)). Washington courts examine cohabiting
relationships for “‘continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship,
pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties.’” Id. (quoting
Connell, 898 P.2d at 834). The Pennington court noted that these five factors “are neither exclusive
nor hypertechnical.” 14 P.3d at 770.
73

Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770 (citing Connell, 898 P.2d at 834–35).

74

Goldberg, supra note 69, at 528–34.

See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing the “verbatim” interpretation of
the Law of Property rule in Missouri).
75

76
See Hoth v. Hoth, 339 S.W.3d 540, 541 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (noting the plaintiff ’s
concession that she and her former cohabitant lacked a family relationship); Johannsen v. McClain,
235 S.W.3d 86, 87–88 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]here exists no family relationship between
[the formerly cohabiting cotenants] . . . .”); Clark v. Dady, 131 S.W.3d 382, 389 (Mo. W. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he record discloses that the parties were not related . . . .”); Montgomery v.
Roberts, 714 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo. E. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding “no evidence . . . [of ] the
existence of a family relationship” between unmarried cohabitants).
77

577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978) (en banc).

78

Id. at 507–08.
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contract listed their names as husband and wife.79 The female cohabitant paid
$1500 toward the $2000 down payment and made one of the required $213.42
monthly payments.80 The male cohabitant paid $500 toward the down payment
and made all subsequent monthly payments.81 After two years the female cohabitant
moved out of the house, and the parties maintained separate households from
then on, with the male cohabitant continuing to make all monthly payments
on the jointly-owned house.82 The male cohabitant subsequently brought suit
seeking a determination of the parties’ respective interests in the house.83
The male cohabitant, who ultimately contributed more toward acquiring the
house than the female cohabitant, argued that the court should fix the parties’
respective interests according to the traditional rules of cotenancy.84 The Beal
court acknowledged these rules, observing that “when the conveyance is taken
in both names the parties would be presumed to share equally, or to share based
upon the amount contributed, if the contributions were traceable.”85 The Beal
court then rejected the traditional rules of cotenancy:
The difficulty with the application of the rules of cotenancy is
that their mechanical operation does not consider the nature of
the relationship of the parties. While this may be appropriate for
commercial investments, a mechanistic application of these rules
will not often accurately reflect the expectations of the parties.86
The Beal court then established a new rule: “[A] division of property accumulated
during a period of cohabitation must be begun by inquiring into the intent of the
parties, and if an intent can be found, it should control that property distribution.”87
Having rejected the traditional rules of cotenancy in favor of a rule under
which the intent of the parties controls, the Beal court held that during the two
years of cohabitation, the parties intended to pool their resources and, thus, should
be considered equal cotenants.88 The Beal court likewise held that the traditional
rules of cotenancy would apply to the period after the female cohabitant moved
79

Id. at 507.

80

Id. at 507–08.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 508.

83

Id. at 507, 509.

84

Id. at 509.

85

Id. at 510 (citations omitted).

86

Id.

Id. The Alaska Supreme Court subsequently adopted this same principle in Wood v. Collins.
812 P.2d 951, 956 (Alaska 1991) (citing Beal, 577 P.2d at 510).
87

Beal, 577 P.2d at 510. The court noted, however, that “fairness dictates that [the female
cohabitant] should receive credit for the $500 additional she paid on the down payment.” Id. at
88
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out of the house.89 The court remanded for the trial court to properly determine
the parties’ respective interests in the property.90

Principal Case
Between February 1996 and July 2007, Jerald Hofstad and Cathryn Christie
were involved in a relationship and lived together for extended periods of time
in Casper, Wyoming.91 Hofstad and Christie never married, but they were
parents of twins born in 1996.92 The couple, their twin sons, and Hofstad’s
five children from a previous relationship lived together in Hofstad’s house on
Monument Road in Casper from 1998 until 2005, when Hofstad and Christie
temporarily separated.93
During this separation, Hofstad sold the Monument residence and entered
into a contract to purchase a new home on Donegal Street in Casper.94 In an
effort to rekindle his relationship with Christie, “Mr. Hofstad represented to Ms.
Christie that he would ‘change,’ they would be married within three months,
that he would undergo counseling, and that Ms. Christie would be a co-owner
or equal owner in the Donegal home.”95 The couple reconciled, and at closing, a
warranty deed conveyed the Donegal home to “Jerald K. Hofstad and Cathryn
Anne Christie, grantee(s).”96 Hofstad made the down payment, paid the closing
costs, and subsequently made all mortgage and utilities payments for the
Donegal home.97 Christie contributed money toward various improvements to
the residence.98
The couple and their children lived together in the Donegal home from May
2005 until July 2007, when Christie moved out.99 Christie subsequently filed
suit seeking partition of the Donegal home, which the parties agreed they held

511. It is unclear why, if the cohabitants intended to pool their resources, the female cohabitant
received a credit for the excess she contributed toward the down payment, but the male cohabitant
did not receive a credit for the excess he contributed toward the regular monthly payments. Id. at
507–08, 511.
89

Id. at 511.

90

Id.

91

Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 816–18 (Wyo. 2010).

92

Id. at 817.

93

Id. at 817–18.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 821.

96

Id. at 818.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.
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as tenants in common.100 Following a bench trial, the district court determined
that, while Hofstad contributed substantially more money toward purchasing and
maintaining the home, Christie was entitled to an equal share because Hofstad
“failed to prove that there was not a family relationship or donative intent.”101
Hofstad appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.102

The Court’s Opinion
In its opinion, written by Justice Hill, the Wyoming Supreme Court began its
discussion by stating the Law of Property rule:
[I]f the instrument does not specify the shares of each co-tenant,
it will be presumed that they take equal, undivided interests.
However, this presumption may be rebutted by parol evidence,
such as proof that the co-tenants contributed unequal amounts
toward the purchase price of the property, and there is neither
a family relationship among the co-tenants nor any evidence of
donative intent on the part of those who contributed more than
their pro rata amounts toward the purchase price.103
The court noted Hofstad and Christie held the disputed property as tenants
in common and that Hofstad had contributed substantially more money toward
the property.104 The court then declared, “we are faced with considering whether
there is either evidence of a family relationship or evidence of donative intent on
the part of Mr. Hofstad, or lack thereof.”105
Hofstad argued that an unmarried, unrelated couple could not share a family
relationship.106 This was a matter of first impression in Wyoming, so the court
“[looked] to other jurisdictions for guidance.”107 It cited three Missouri cases in
which courts denied recovery for the value of household services rendered during a

100

Id. at 818–19.

101

Id. at 818.

102

Id.

Id. at 818–19 (citations omitted) (citing Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., 86 P.3d 843, 850 (Wyo.
2004)). While citing the language of the Law of Property rule from Bixler, the Hofstad court
never directly cited The Law of Property itself. See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at passim; supra note 42 and
accompanying text (discussing the Bixler court’s adoption of the Law of Property rule).
103

104

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 819.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.
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period of cohabitation because the cohabiting parties shared a “family relation.”108
The Hofstad court also quoted at length an Oregon Court of Appeals decision that
determined a “family” must consist of more than one person.109 The Hofstad court
then quoted section 34-13-114(a)(x) of the Wyoming Statutes, defining a minor’s
family members as “the minor’s parent, stepparent, spouse, grandparent, brother,
sister, uncle or aunt, whether of whole or half blood or by adoption.”110 Finally,
the Hofstad court cited a United States Supreme Court decision as support for
recognizing broader family relationships than just parents and their children.111
The Hofstad court then declared:
Although the term “family relationship” is by no means
absolute, we agree with the district court and Ms. Christie that
in this case, the parties do share a family relationship, largely
by way of their sharing two children. Even if Mr. Hofstad and
Ms. Christie are not married, nor related by blood, that they
lived together on and off for approximately ten years, all the
while sharing an intimate relationship which resulted in the
birth of their twins is evidence that a family relationship exists.
Mr. Hofstad and Ms. Christie may never consider themselves
“family,” having never been married; however, their twin sons
bind the four of them inextricably and forever, resulting in a
family relationship.112

Id. (citing Wells v. Goff, 239 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1951) (per curiam); Johnston v. Estate of
Phillips, 706 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Manning v. Driscoll’s Estate, 174 S.W.2d 921
(Mo. Ct. App. 1943)). The Hofstad court probably could have cited a Wyoming case for this same
proposition. See Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131 (Wyo. 1995) (“The estate claims that under
the fourth element [the female cohabitant] cannot recover for unjust enrichment because she cared
for [the male cohabitant] in a gratuitous family relationship. We agree.”). The Hofstad court did not
cite Adkins, however. See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at passim.
108

109
Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 819–20 (citing Empl. Dep’t v. Stock Secrets, Inc., 150 P.3d 1090,
1092 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)).
110

Id. at 820 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-13-114(a)(x) (2009)).

Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (1977)). In Moore, a grand
mother who lived with her son and two grandsons, who were first cousins, was charged with violating
an East Cleveland housing ordinance that restricted “occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of
a single family.” 431 U.S. at 495–96. Recognizing the “tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children,” a plurality of the
Court held that “the choice of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly
be denied by the State.” Id. at 505–06. The Hofstad court’s pinpoint citation to page 543 of the
Supreme Court’s opinion, a passage of Justice White’s dissent, may be a typographical error. See
Moore, 431 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting).
111

112

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 820.
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Having determined that Hofstad and Christie shared a family relationship,
the court next considered evidence of donative intent by Hofstad.113 Hofstad
argued that Christie could only receive an equal share of the disputed house
if she “actually prove[d] that a gift of one-half of the value of the home was
given to her.”114 In other words, he argued that whatever the parties might have
implicitly intended, only express donative intent would entitle her to an equal
share under the Law of Property rule.115 This was also a matter of first impression
in Wyoming.116
Again looking to other jurisdictions, the Hofstad court discussed two decisions
from Alaska.117 The court then borrowed a passage from the Oregon Supreme
Court’s decision in Beal v. Beal:
Using the rules of cotenancy, when the conveyance is
taken in both names, the parties would be presumed to share
equally or to share based upon the amount contributed, if the
contributions were traceable (rebuttable by donative intent
or a family relationship). Such rules of cotenancy could also
result in requiring a showing of who paid various items, such
as taxes, mortgage payments, or repairs. The difficulty with the
application of the rules of cotenancy is that their mechanical
operation does not consider the nature of the relationship of
the parties. While this may be appropriate for commercial
investments, a mechanistic application of these rules will not
often accurately reflect the expectations of the parties.118
The Hofstad court subsequently discussed Beal and ultimately declared, “we
agree with Beal that property accumulated before separation should be divided by
determining the express or implied intent of the parties.”119 Thus, the Wyoming
Supreme Court rejected Hofstad’s argument that only express donative intent
should entitle Christie to an equal share of the disputed house.120

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

See id.

116

Id.

Id. (citing D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94, 97 (Alaska 1994); Wood v. Collins, 812 P.2d 951,
957 (Alaska 1991)).
117

Id. at 820–21 (citations omitted). The Hofstad court inserted the phrase “(rebuttable by
donative intent or a family relationship),” but otherwise inserted this passage verbatim from Beal v.
Beal. 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
118

119

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821.

120

See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
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In considering both the express and implied intent of the parties, the Hofstad
court noted that prior to purchasing the disputed house, Hofstad promised that
“Christie would be a co-owner or equal owner” of the house if she agreed to
resume their relationship.121 Likewise, the court found “as conclusive evidence of
Mr. Hofstad’s intent . . . [that] he put Ms. Christie’s name on the . . . deed after
they rekindled their relationship.”122
The court then granted Christie an equal share of the disputed house because,
“[g]iven the parties’ children and living situation over the course of the past
ten years, a family relationship existed. Furthermore, given the circumstances
surrounding the purchase of [the disputed house] and the parties’ reconciliation,
evidence of donative intent existed.”123

Analysis
In Hofstad v. Christie, the Wyoming Supreme Court correctly held that the
parties owned equal shares of the disputed house. In reaching this holding, however,
the court rejected a rigid interpretation of the Law of Property rule.124 Instead, the
Hofstad court established a flexible analytical framework under which a court’s
determination of the express or implied intent of the cotenants, informed by the
nature of their relationship, controls the division of their property.125 Therefore,
rather than stating the Law of Property rule verbatim, future Wyoming Courts
should adopt the “relevant evidence” formulation of the rule.126 This formulation
accurately synthesizes the reasoning of the Hofstad court.127 Moreover, prior
Wyoming Supreme Court decisions involving cohabitants and married cotenants
support the “relevant evidence” formulation.128 Thus, in the final analysis, Hofstad
established an intent-based framework for analyzing cotenancy disputes while
preserving the Wyoming Supreme Court’s longstanding recognition that, while
cohabitants are bound by their promises and conduct, no relationship between
cotenants establishes an irrebuttable presumption of equal ownership.129

121

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 822.

124

See infra notes 130–45 and accompanying text.

125

See infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.

126

See infra notes 146–83 and accompanying text.

127

See infra notes 146–64 and accompanying text.

128

See infra notes 165–83 and accompanying text.

129

See infra notes 184–206 and accompanying text.
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The Hofstad Court Rejected a Rigid Interpretation of the Law of
Property Rule
An argument that the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the rigid “verbatim”
interpretation of the Law of Property rule in Hofstad, though incorrect, is not
entirely unreasonable. On its face, the language of the rule suggests that a family
relationship between cotenants establishes an irrebuttable presumption that they
share their property equally.130 And indeed, the Hofstad court declared it was
“faced with considering whether there is either evidence of a family relationship or
evidence of donative intent.”131 This declaration could be read as suggesting that,
even in the absence of donative intent by Hofstad, the court’s finding of a family
relationship between the parties would have been sufficient to award Christie
an equal share of the disputed house.132 Under this reading of Hofstad, future
cohabiting cotenants found to have a family relationship—indicated by long-term
cohabitation, an intimate relationship, and especially shared children133—would
share their property equally, irrespective of intent or unequal contributions.134
Thus, cohabitants in a family relationship would enjoy legal status in Wyoming.135
This reading of Hofstad is incorrect, however, because despite stating the Law of
Property rule verbatim, the Wyoming Supreme Court did not apply the “verbatim”
interpretation of the rule.136 Nothing suggests the Hofstad court intended to follow
the Missouri “verbatim” interpretation since the Wyoming Supreme Court cited
no cases in which Missouri courts applied the Law of Property rule.137 Moreover,
130
See Nelson v. Killman (In re Killman), Bankr. No. 08-61703, Adversary No. 09-6075, 2010
WL 743685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2010) (holding that “[b]ecause of the family relationship
[between the cotenants], the unequal contribution is irrelevant and the presumption of equal
ownership stands”); Hoit v. Rankin, 320 S.W.3d 761, 786 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (observing
that the language of the Law of Property rule “reads like an irrebuttable presumption”).
131

Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 819 (Wyo. 2010) (emphasis added).

See id. At least one major secondary resource has adopted this reading of Hofstad, offering
the following summary of the case:
132

Cotenant, who had lived in home with her partner on and off for ten years
and with whom she had two children, but to whom she was never married, shared
a “family relationship” with the partner so as to defeat the partner’s ability to rebut the
presumption, in partition action, of equal division between cotenants, even though the
partner made the sole contribution toward the purchase price of the home.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 117 (Supp. 2011) (citing Hofstad, 240 P.3d 816)
(emphasis added).
133

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 820; see supra text accompanying note 112.

134

See supra note 130.

See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text (discussing division of property based on
legal status relationships).
135

136

See infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.

See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at passim. The Wyoming Supreme Court was almost certainly aware
of these Missouri cases because, in Bixler v. Oro Management, the court quoted the Law of Property
rule verbatim from a decision by the Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals. 86 P.3d
137
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contrary to the “verbatim” interpretation, the Wyoming Supreme Court did
not treat the family relationship between Hofstad and Christie as sufficient to
award Christie an equal share of the disputed house; rather, the court considered
donative intent by Hofstad even after finding a family relationship.138
Furthermore, the reasoning underlying the Hofstad court’s application
of the Law of Property rule forecloses any argument that the court applied the
“verbatim” interpretation. Awarding equal shares of jointly owned property based
solely on a family relationship, without considering unequal contributions or the
parties’ intent, would contradict the Hofstad court’s statement that “a mechanistic
application of [the rules of cotenancy] will not often accurately reflect the
expectations of the parties.”139 And awarding equal shares based solely on a
family relationship cannot be reconciled with the court’s holding that “property
accumulated before separation should be divided by determining the express or
implied intent of the parties.”140
Likewise, the reasoning underlying the decision in Hofstad forecloses a
potential argument that the court applied the “modified verbatim” interpretation
of the Law of Property rule, under which cotenants are irrebuttably presumed
to share their property equally if a court finds both a family relationship and
donative intent.141 Unlike the “verbatim” interpretation, the “modified verbatim”
interpretation would be consistent with the Hofstad court’s considering donative
intent even after finding a family relationship.142 But the “modified verbatim”
interpretation, given its potential for an irrebuttable presumption, is inconsistent
with the court’s rejection of “mechanistic” cotenancy rules.143 Moreover, under
the “modified verbatim” interpretation, the outcome in a cotenancy dispute
might depend on whether the parties share a family relationship, irrespective
of their intent.144 This contradicts the Hofstad court’s holding that the intent of
the parties controls, and thus, Hofstad does not support the “modified verbatim”
interpretation of the Law of Property rule.145
843, 850 (quoting Christen v. Christen, 38 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Mo. S. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). Both
Hofstad and Christie cited Bixler in their briefs, but neither cited any Missouri case applying the
Law of Property rule. See Brief of Appellant Jerald Korwin Hofstad at ii, Hofstad, 240 P.3d 816 (No.
S-09-0246), 2010 WL 1367657; Brief of Appellee at ii–iii, Hofstad, 240 P.3d 816 (No. S-09-0246),
2010 WL 1367656.
138

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 820.

139

Id. at 821.

140

Id.

141

See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the “modified verbatim” interpretation).

142

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 820.

143

Id. at 821.

See Hoit v. Rankin, 320 S.W.3d 761, 769–70 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing the
“modified verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property rule).
144

145

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821.
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The “Relevant Evidence” Formulation is Consistent with Hofstad
Only two Wyoming Supreme Court decisions have cited the language of the
Law of Property rule verbatim.146 In Bixler v. Oro Management, the court merely
quoted the rule in dictum.147 In Hofstad, the court quoted the rule from Bixler
but clearly rejected the “verbatim” interpretation of the rule.148 Thus, the original
language of the Law of Property rule has no precedential value in Wyoming, and
to avoid the “verbatim” interpretation, future Wyoming courts should not state
the original language of the rule.149 Instead, Wyoming courts should adopt the
“relevant evidence” formulation of the Law of Property rule devised by the Western
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Hoit v. Rankin.150
As a threshold matter, the decision in Hoit v. Rankin was released just nine days
before the decision in Hofstad.151 Thus, while the Wyoming Supreme Court was
almost certainly aware of Missouri cases applying the “verbatim” interpretation
of the Law of Property rule,152 the Wyoming Supreme Court likely had no
opportunity to consider Hoit, which appears nowhere in the Hofstad opinion.153
Nevertheless, the language of the “relevant evidence” formulation accurately
synthesizes and describes the Hofstad court’s reasoning and application of the Law of
Property rule.154
In its initial verbatim statement of the Law of Property rule, the Hofstad court
noted two established principles of Wyoming cotenancy law: (1) an unambiguous
instrument of conveyance specifying cotenants’ respective ownership shares
controls a court’s disposition of their property and (2) in the absence of such an
instrument, a court will presume the parties own equal shares in the property, but
this presumption may be rebutted by evidence of unequal contributions toward
the property.155 The language of the “relevant evidence” formulation preserves
both principles: “The presumption that co-tenants hold equal ownership shares
in the face of a deed that is otherwise silent may be rebutted. Evidence relevant

146

Id. at 818–19; Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., 86 P.3d 843, 850 (Wyo. 2004).

147

86 P.3d at 850; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.

148

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 118–19; see supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.

See Hoit, 320 S.W.3d at 772 (rejecting the “verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property
rule and concluding that the rule “should no longer be cited verbatim [because] the manner in
which the principle was initially written improvidently suggests the existence of an irrebuttable
presumption” (footnote omitted)).
149

150

See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (quoting the “relevant evidence” formulation).

151

See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 816; Hoit, 320 S.W.3d at 761.

152

See supra note 137.

153

See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at passim.

154

See infra notes 155–64 and accompanying text.

155

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 818–19; see supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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to rebut the presumption may include evidence that the co-tenants contributed
unequally toward the purchase of the property.”156
Beyond preserving these established principles of Wyoming cotenancy law, the
“relevant evidence” formulation also reflects the Hofstad court’s actual application
of the Law of Property rule and the reasoning underlying that application.157 The
Hofstad court held that when cohabiting cotenants have contributed unequally
toward jointly owned property, it “should be divided by determining the express
or implied intent of the parties.”158 The Hofstad court also considered evidence
of a family relationship between the parties.159 Thus, Hofstad established a
flexible analytical framework: the intent of the cohabiting cotenants ultimately
controls the division of their jointly owned property, but while the existence
of a family relationship is not dispositive,160 evidence of a family relationship
between cotenants is nonetheless relevant to a court’s determination of their
respective shares.161
The “relevant evidence” formulation describes the same framework:
“[U]nequal contributions may be explained by evidence that the co-tenant
contributing a greater amount toward purchase intended the disparity as an
enforceable gift, a determination which may be influenced by evidence of the
nature of the relationship among the co-tenants.”162 Testing the “relevant evidence”
formulation against the holding in Hofstad v. Christie, Hofstad’s promise to make
Christie an equal owner of the house, and subsequently putting her name on
the deed, evidenced his intent for the disparity in their contributions to be an
enforceable gift.163 Moreover, the nature of the parties’ relationship—a long-term,
intimate, cohabiting relationship with shared children—influenced the court’s
determination of their intent.164 Thus, unlike a verbatim statement of the Law of
Property rule, the “relevant evidence” formulation accurately describes the holding

156

Hoit, 320 S.W.3d at 772.

157

See infra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.

158

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821.

159

Id. at 819–20.

160

See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.

See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 822 (affirming the ruling of the district court granting Christie an
equal share of the disputed house and noting that “[g]iven the parties’ children and living situation
over the course of the past ten years, a family relationship existed”).
161

162

Hoit v. Rankin, 320 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).

See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821–22 (discussing evidence of Hofstad’s donative intent). Merely
putting Christie’s name on the deed did not establish Hofstad’s intent to give her an equal share
of the house; rather, he evinced this intent by promising to make her an equal owner of the house
if they renewed their relationship and putting her name on the deed after they did renew their
relationship. Id. at 821–22.
163

See id. at 820–22 (describing the parties’ relationship and noting the status of their
relationship in discussing evidence of Hofstad’s donative intent).
164
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and reasoning of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Hofstad. Future Wyoming
courts should therefore adopt the “relevant evidence” formulation as a matter
of precedent.

Wyoming Case Law Supports the “Relevant Evidence” Formulation
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not applied the Law of Property rule
except in Hofstad v. Christie,165 but the court’s reasoning in other cohabitation
and cotenancy cases supports the “relevant evidence” formulation of the rule over
the “verbatim” interpretation. The court has regularly enforced valid agreements
between cohabitants,166 including an agreement between cohabiting cotenants
to share their property equally,167 but has also emphasized that a cohabiting
relationship cannot cure an otherwise defective contract.168 The court has likewise
emphasized that, because Wyoming does not recognize common-law marriage,
a cohabiting relationship does not itself establish implied contract or equitable
claims by one cohabitant against another.169 The potential enforceability of such
claims stems not from the status of the parties’ relationship, but rather from
promises or conduct suggesting the acceptance of certain obligations170 and the
intent of the parties.171
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s established reliance on traditional principles
of contract law and manifest unwillingness to recognize legal status for cohabitants
in previous cases weigh against any argument that the Hofstad court recognized
165

See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Allen v. Anderson, 253 P.3d 182, 183–84 (Wyo. 2011) (affirming the distribution of
a formerly cohabiting couple’s real and personal property pursuant to a settlement agreement between
the parties); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595–96 (Wyo. 1981) (affirming the enforcement of
an oral agreement between cohabitants in settlement of the woman’s equitable claims).
166

167
Schulz v. Miller, 837 P.2d 71, 75, 77–78 (Wyo. 1992). The court explained: “In reality,
the transaction can be most accurately delineated as an agreement to make a gift when the purchase
agreement was signed, with the gift then finalized and completed by delivery and acceptance of the
recorded deed.” Id. at 77 (citation omitted).

See Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1158–59 (Wyo. 1982) (“[P]urported ‘agreements’
between [cohabiting] couples are [not] exempt from compliance with Wyoming’s law of contracts.”).
168

Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 437–38 (Wyo. 1998) (“We have long rejected the validity of
claims based solely on the fact that the parties cohabited for an extended period of time precisely
because we do not recognize common law marriage.” (citing Kinnison, 627 P.2d at 595; Roberts v.
Roberts (In re Roberts’ Estate), 133 P.2d 492, 502 (Wyo. 1943))).
169

170
See Shaw, 964 P.2d at 438 (“If . . . the application of contractual principles associated with
an implied contract will impose unwanted obligations on cohabiting parties, we can only suggest
that the parties refrain from conduct that implies the acceptance of such obligations or that the
parties clearly identify the limits of their oral promises.”).
171
See Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131–32 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff could
not recover the value of services rendered during a period of cohabitation under the doctrine of
unjust enrichment because the plaintiff had cared for her partner out of love without expecting to
be repaid).
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such status for cohabitants under the “verbatim” interpretation of the Law of
Property rule.172 Conversely, the “relevant evidence” formulation comports with
the rationale underlying the court’s decisions in prior cohabitation cases: as with
contract claims, the outcome of property disputes between cotenants depends
on the intent of the parties, informed by their conduct and the circumstances of
their relationship.173
Similarly, the “relevant evidence” formulation harmonizes with the Wyoming
Supreme Court’s previous decisions in cases involving married cotenants.174 In
such cases, the court has repeatedly held that, “when title to real estate was taken
in the names of both spouses but only one spouse paid for it, there [is] a rebuttable
presumption that a fifty percent interest was intended as a gift to the nonpaying
spouse.”175 Applying this principle, the Wyoming Supreme Court has repeatedly
divided the property of married cotenants according to the intent of the parties.176
These holdings cannot be reconciled with the “verbatim” interpretation of the
Law of Property rule, under which a married couple’s family relationship177 would
establish an irrebuttable presumption that they share their property equally.178
Future courts might avoid this contradiction, of course, by only applying
the “verbatim” interpretation in cohabitation cases, not marital cotenancy cases.
This, however, would result in greater property rights for non-contributing
cohabitants than non-contributing spouses because cohabiting cotenants in a
family relationship would be irrebuttably presumed to share their property equally
while spouses would not.179 Such an outcome contradicts the Wyoming Supreme
172
Compare Nelson v. Killman (In re Killman), Bankr. No. 08-61703, Adversary No. 09-6075,
2010 WL 743685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2010) (“Because of the family relationship [between
the cotenants], the unequal contribution is irrelevant and the presumption of equal ownership
stands.”), with Shaw, 964 P.2d at 437–38 (“We have long rejected the validity of claims based solely
on the fact that the parties cohabited for an extended period of time precisely because we do not
recognize common law marriage.”).
173

See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (quoting the “relevant evidence” formulation).

174

See infra notes 175–83 and accompanying text.

DeJohn v. DeJohn, 121 P.3d 802, 809 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1,
4 (Wyo. 2000)); see Tyler v. Tyler, 624 P.2d 784, 785–86 (Wyo. 1981).
175

176

See supra note 34.

See Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 820 (Wyo. 2010) (finding a family relationship
between the parties “even if [they] are not married, nor related by blood”); Margaret M. Mahoney,
Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 135, 158–59
(2005) (observing that marriage is a quintessential family status relationship).
177

178

See supra note 130.

Compare Nelson v. Killman (In re Killman), Bankr. No. 08-61703, Adversary No. 09-6075,
2010 WL 743685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2010) (“Because of the family relationship [between
the cotenants], the unequal contribution is irrelevant and the presumption of equal ownership
stands.”), with, Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2000) (“[W]hen title to real estate was taken in the
names of both spouses but only one spouse paid for it, there [is] a rebuttable presumption that a fifty
percent interest was intended as a gift to the nonpaying spouse.”).
179
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Court’s express recognition that married couples enjoy greater protections than
cohabitants.180 This recognition, coupled with the court’s established rule that
even married cotenants are not irrebuttably presumed to share their property
equally, weigh heavily against any argument that the Hofstad court adopted the
“verbatim” interpretation of the Law of Property rule and recognized legal status
for cohabitants.
Conversely, the Wyoming Supreme Court’s marital cotenancy jurisprudence
supports the “relevant evidence” formulation of the Law of Property rule because,
under the “relevant evidence” formulation, a family relationship between
cohabiting cotenants does not establish an irrebuttable presumption that the
parties share the property equally.181 Rather, a court considers “the nature of the
relationship among the co-tenants” as evidence of their intent.182 The “relevant
evidence” formulation thus comports with the established Wyoming rule that, in
determining the ownership shares of cotenants, even a marital relationship does
not trump the intent of the parties.183 Future Wyoming courts may adopt the
“relevant evidence” formulation as fully consistent with established Wyoming law.

What Hofstad Means for Wyoming Cotenancy Law
The decision in Hofstad v. Christie preserved and clarified several bedrock
principles of Wyoming cotenancy law. When an instrument of conveyance
unambiguously specifies cotenants’ respective shares in their property, the
instrument controls and may not be contradicted by parol evidence.184 When
the instrument of conveyance does not otherwise specify, cotenants are presumed
to share their property equally.185 The mere presence of each cotenant’s name on
an instrument does not, however, establish that they share the disputed property

See Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981) (“In this state, living arrangements
between a man and woman must be formalized by the state before the traditional protections of the
marriage relationship can be invoked.”).
180

See Hoit v. Rankin, 320 S.W.3d 761, 770 (Mo. W. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[W]e do not
believe . . . the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership becomes irrebuttable even if evidence of
both a family relationship and donative intent are present.”); supra notes 64–65 and accompanying
text (quoting the “relevant evidence” formulation).
181

182

See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (quoting the “relevant evidence” formulation).

183

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

See Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 818 (Wyo. 2010); Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., 86 P.3d 843,
850 (Wyo. 2004); Schulz v. Miller, 837 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 1992).
184

185

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 818 (citing Bixler, 86 P.3d at 850).
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equally.186 Instead, the presumption of equal shares may be rebutted by evidence
of unequal contributions toward the property.187
Hofstad established that cohabitants’ express or implied intent ultimately
determines the distribution of their jointly owned property.188 Hofstad likewise
established that, in reaching this determination, a court must consider evidence of
a family relationship between the parties.189 The Hofstad court rejected, however,
any notion that a family relationship between cohabiting cotenants entitles them
to equal ownership.190 Rather, the court established a flexible analytical framework
under which the property of cohabiting cotenants should be distributed according
to a determination of their express or implied intent, a determination which may
be influenced by evidence of a family relationship.191
The Hofstad court indicated that this framework should apply in all noncommercial cotenancy disputes.192 Whether the Hofstad framework should
also apply in cases involving corporate cotenants is less certain. In Bixler v. Oro
Management, the Wyoming Supreme Court suggested—without holding—the
original language of the Law of Property rule might apply in a corporate cotenancy
case.193 In Hofstad, the court indicated that a “mechanical” application of the Law
of Property rule “may be appropriate for commercial investments.”194 If future
Wyoming courts apply a rigid formulation of the rule in corporate cotenancy

186
Id. at 818–19 (considering parol evidence to determine the cotenants’ respective shares
despite the presence of both names on the deed); cf. Schulz, 837 P.2d at 73, 78 (Cardine, J.,
dissenting) (“The purchase offer and acceptance agreement [containing the names of both parties]
indicates only that appellant and appellee are the purchasers of this real estate. From the writing
itself, it is impossible to ascertain who should pay, whether there was a gift, or how title should
be held.”).
187
Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 818; Bixler, 86 P.3d at 850; see Binning v. Miller, 102 P.2d 64, 77
(Wyo. 1940) (“[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, joint purchasers of an estate held
shares therein in proportion to their contribution to the purchase price.” (citation omitted)); supra
note 32.
188

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821.

See id. at 819–20, 822 (discussing the issue of whether the parties shared a family
relationship and referencing this relationship in its disposition of the case).
189

190

See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.

191

See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.

See Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821 (“The difficulty with the application of the rules of cotenancy
is that their mechanical operation does not consider the nature of the relationship of the parties.
While this may be appropriate for commercial investments, a mechanistic application of these rules
will not often accurately reflect the expectations of the parties.”).
192

86 P.3d 843, 850 (Wyo. 2004); see supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text (discussing Bixler).
193

194

240 P.3d at 821.
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cases, however, the original language of the Law of Property rule should be modified
to avoid suggesting that a similarly rigid rule should apply in cases involving
family relationships.195

What Hofstad Means for Wyoming Cohabitants
Professor Goldberg has suggested that states may revive the doctrine of
common-law marriage by extending shared property rights to cohabitants whose
relationships resemble traditional marriages.196 But in Hofstad, the Wyoming
Supreme Court did not extend shared property rights to cohabiting cotenants
based on the nature of their relationship.197 Instead, the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that when cotenants have cohabited, the distribution of their property
depends on their intent.198 And while the distribution of jointly owned property
between married cotenants in Wyoming also depends on their intent,199 this
similarity between marital and cohabitant cotenancy law in Wyoming does not
indicate a revival of the doctrine of common-law marriage. Rather, the Wyoming
Supreme Court’s holding in Hofstad conforms to the established rule that, in
Wyoming, even a marriage relationship is not enough to defeat the intent of
the parties with respect to their jointly owned property.200 Just as cohabitants in
Wyoming may be bound by theories of contract law based on their promises and
conduct,201 so too may the conduct and intent of cohabiting cotenants affect their
joint ownership of property.202
As a practical matter, of course, this distinction between status- and intentbased property distributions may make little difference to “the ex-boyfriend [or
girlfriend] who now wants his [or her] real estate back free and clear of claim
by the co-grantee.”203 Cohabitants in Wyoming may, however, take preventative
measures to protect their property. A cohabitant who contributes more toward
a joint purchase than her counterpart may guarantee herself a proportional
interest in the property through explicit language in the deed, rendering the
Hofstad analysis inapplicable.204 Cohabitants may also protect their interests by

195

See supra note 149.

196

See Goldberg, supra note 69, at 537.

197

See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.

198

Hofstad, 240 P.3d at 821.

199

See supra note 34.

200

See supra note 34.

201

See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.

203

Schulz v. Miller, 837 P.2d 71, 73 (Wyo. 1992).

204

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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entering into an express agreement governing the distribution of their property.205
Most importantly, as the Wyoming Supreme Court suggested in Shaw v. Smith,
cohabitants seeking to avoid unwanted obligations should “refrain from conduct
that implies the acceptance of such obligations . . . [and] clearly identify the limits
of their oral promises.”206
It remains to be seen whether future Wyoming litigants will cite Hofstad in
support of expanded legal rights for cohabitants beyond the context of property
law, but the court’s holding that cohabitants may share a family relationship
suggests such arguments may eventually arise. For example, courts in both New
Hampshire and New Jersey have concluded that a close relationship between
unmarried cohabitants may support a tort claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.207 In Gates v. Richardson, the Wyoming Supreme Court
limited “the class of plaintiffs who may bring an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress” to “spouses, children, parents, and siblings.”208 Yet the court has
parenthetically construed Gates using different language: “[N]egligent infliction
of emotional distress [is] limited by the requirements of a family relationship and
observation of serious bodily harm.”209 Future litigants might therefore cite the
finding of a family relationship between the parties in Hofstad in arguing that
a cohabitant who witnesses an injury to her partner should be able to bring an
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Conclusion
In Hofstad v. Christie, the Wyoming Supreme Court established a flexible
analytical framework for analyzing a cotenancy dispute between former cohabitants:
such parties are presumed to share their property equally, but considering evidence
of unequal contributions and the nature of the parties’ relationship, a court must

205
See Allen v. Anderson, 253 P.3d 182, 183–84 (Wyo. 2011) (affirming the distribution of a
formerly cohabiting couple’s personal property pursuant to an unambiguous settlement agreement
between the parties).
206

964 P.2d 428, 438 (Wyo. 1998).

Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1258, 1261–62 (N.H. 2003); see Dunphy v. Gregor,
642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. 1994). Factors indicating cohabitants share a “close relationship” in this
context include:
207

[T]he duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of
common contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of shared experience,
and . . . whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of the same
household, their emotional reliance on each other, the particulars of their day to day
relationship, and the manner in which they related to each other in attending to life’s
mundane requirements.
Graves, 818 A.2d at 1262 (quoting Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378).
208

719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986).

209

Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 199 (Wyo. 2003) (citation omitted).
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ultimately settle the dispute by determining the express or implied intent of
the parties.210 To preserve this framework, future Wyoming courts should not
state the original language of the Law of Property rule, which the Hofstad court
clearly rejected.211 Instead, future Wyoming courts should adopt the “relevant
evidence” formulation of the rule, which comports with both the reasoning in
Hofstad and established principles of Wyoming law.212 Despite finding a family
relationship between the parties in Hofstad, the Wyoming Supreme Court, far
from recognizing legal status for unmarried cohabitants in Wyoming, merely
affirmed its longstanding recognition that cohabiting parties, like married parties,
may be bound by their intent.213

210

See supra notes 155–61 and accompanying text.

211

See supra notes 130–49 and accompanying text.

212

See supra notes 150–83 and accompanying text.

213

See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text.
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